Category: Discrimination

The Appellate Division Clarifies Disability Discrimination Claims Based on Obesity under the Law Against Discrimination

Ryan Savercool

The Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, protects individuals from discrimination based on a person’s actual or perceived disability.  However, obesity is not considered an actionable disability under the LAD unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the condition is “caused by bodily injury, birth defect[,] or illness.”  Viscik v. Fowler, 173 N.J. 1, 17 (2002) (quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q)).  In Dickson v. Community Bus Lines, Inc., __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div. Apr. 4, 2019), the Appellate Division clarified the contours of a valid hostile work environment claim premised on a plaintiff’s perceived disability stemming from his or her obesity.  The panel held that “a perceived disability claim based on obesity must be grounded upon direct or circumstantial evidence that defendants perceived the plaintiff to be disabled due to a medical condition that caused him or her to be overweight.”   In the absence of such evidence, an employer is entitled to the summary judgment dismissal of a LAD claim predicated on alleged weight discrimination. 

In Dickson, the plaintiff Corey Dickson, who weighed between 500 and 600 pounds, worked for the defendant Community Bus Lines as a driver for approximately ten years.  Dickson alleged that he was subjected to rude comments about his weight by his co-workers in the break room after work.  However, there was no evidence that Dickson was perceived as disabled during his ten years with the company. 

As a condition of his employment, Dickson was required to possess a valid Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) and a medical certification card that indicated his physical fitness to drive a bus.  From 2005 to 2015, Dickson passed the required medical certification examinations.  Following two independent medical examinations in 2015, however, Dickson was temporarily disqualified from driving pending further testing regarding potential adverse consequences from his weight.  Critically, no determination was made that Dickson was disabled; rather, the doctors determined that additional testing was required pursuant to United States Department of Transportation regulations. 

Dickson subsequently filed suit, claiming that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based upon a perceived disability (obesity).  The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the case, finding that Dickson’s obesity did not constitute an actual or perceived disability under the LAD and that his co-workers’ conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive  to constitute a hostile work environment. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, and reiterated several key principles governing hostile work environment claims predicated on weight discrimination.  The panel explained that “the factfinder’s first inquiry is whether the plaintiff has proven that he or she had a disease or condition recognized as a disability under the LAD.”  Dickson, slip op. at 10 (quoting Delvecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 224 N.J. 559, 573 (2016)).  In this case, the Appellate Division found that “plaintiff failed to meet this threshold requirement under the LAD because his obesity was not a disability caused by a bodily injury, birth defect, or illness.”  Id. at 11. 

The Appellate Division emphasized that “LAD claims based upon a perceived disability still require ‘a perceived characteristic that, if genuine, would qualify a person for the protections of the LAD.’”  Ibid. (quoting Cowher v. Carson & Roberts, 425 N.J. Super. 285, 296 (App. Div. 2012)).  The panel thus distinguished a religious discrimination claim premised on a mistaken perception that an individual belonged to a protected religious group from Dickson’s claims because “obesity alone is not protected under the LAD as a disability unless it has an underlying medical cause, a condition that plaintiff failed to meet in the present case.”  Id. at 12.

The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff “did not establish that defendants viewed him as anything other than obese, which is not a protected class under the LAD,” and that Dickson “did not demonstrate that defendants perceived him as being disabled.” Ibid. The panel noted that there was no evidence that Dickson’s supervisors “took any actions to change the conditions of his employment as the result of any ‘perceived disability,’” and that, notwithstanding his weight,  Dickson was subject to the same work conditions as his co-workers, received several awards, and had passed his medical certification examinations for the ten years preceding his temporary leave.  Moreover, none of the independent doctors who examined plaintiff determined that he was disabled. 

In sum, the Appellate Division reaffirmed that obesity alone is not a protected category under the LAD.  Rather, a plaintiff claiming hostile work environment based on weight discrimination must additionally prove that (1) the obesity has an underlying medical cause; or (2) the plaintiff’s co-workers perceived him or her as disabled, rather than as merely obese. 

Governor Signs Bill Barring Certain Non-Disclosure and Waiver of Rights Provisions in Employment Contracts and Settlement Agreements

David J. Reilly

On March 18, 2019, Governor Phil Murphy signed into law an amendment to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) barring enforcement of certain non-disclosure provisions in employment contracts and settlement agreements, as well as employment contract provisions which waive “any substantive or procedural right or remedy relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment . . . .”  Although this amendment was enacted largely in response to the recent wave of highly publicized cases in which prior victims of sexual harassers and abusers had signed non-disclosure agreements, it broadly covers all claims of workplace discrimination, retaliation and harassment.   The new law applies to “all contracts and agreements entered into, renewed, modified, or amended on or after” March 18, 2019.

A. Prohibition Against Non-Disclosure Provisions

Under the new amendment, any provision in an employment contract or settlement agreement which would conceal the “details relating to” a discrimination, retaliation or harassment claim under the LAD is unenforceable against any current or former employee, and contrary to public policy. The term “details,” however, is undefined, and therefore it is unclear whether an agreement to keep certain settlement terms confidential, such as the amount of payment, still would be enforceable under the new law. Unfortunately, there will be no definitive answer to this question until the term is clarified either through regulation or by the courts.

The new law does permit non-disclosure provisions in an employment contract or a settlement agreement to be enforced against an employer, unless the employee or former employee has publicly revealed “sufficient details of the claim so that the employer is reasonably identifiable . . . .” 

The new law also does not prohibit employers from requiring employees to sign non-competition agreements and agreements not to disclose non-public trade secrets, business plan and customer information. 

B. Notice Requirement

The new law requires that every settlement agreement resolving a workplace discrimination, retaliation or harassment claim include a bold, prominently placed notice providing that “[a]lthough the parties may have agreed to keep the settlement and underlying facts confidential, such a provision in an agreement is unenforceable against the employer if the employee publicly reveals sufficient details of the claim so that the employer is reasonably identifiable.”  The new law requires this notice even if the settlement agreement does not contain a non-disclosure provision.

C. Prohibition of Waivers of Rights or Remedies

The new law also prohibits provisions in any “employment contract” which prospectively waive any substantive or procedural rights or remedies relating to a discrimination, retaliation, or harassment claim.   This section of the law, however, does not apply to collective bargaining agreements. 

This section of the new law effectively prohibits agreements to arbitrate discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims, as well as agreements to waive jury trials, shorten statutory limitations periods, place caps on damages, and any other provisions relating to a substantive or procedural right or remedy under the LAD.   To the extent the new law prohibits agreements to arbitrate, however, it likely will be challenged in court as pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  Although we cannot predict the outcome of such a court challenge, courts generally have held that the FAA preempts statutes which purport to render agreements to arbitrate unenforceable. 

D. Meaning of “Employment Contract”

Neither this amendment nor any other part of the LAD defines an “employment contract.”  However, it is likely that courts will construe the term broadly to include any agreement between an employer and employee (excluding collective bargaining agreements) which sets forth terms and conditions of employment.  This could include, for example, an employer’s handbook or policies, which under some circumstances might be construed as an implied contract between the employer and employee.  Because the new law applies to “employment contracts” that are modified or amended after March 18, 2019, employers would be well-advised to obtain legal advice before making any changes to an employee handbook or employee policies.     

E. Potential Remedies Under the Amendment

The new law prohibits employers from enforcing or attempting to enforce the prohibited provisions against employees or former employees, who may be entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against an action to enforce such a provision.  The law also provides that anyone claiming to be “aggrieved” by a violation of the new amendment may file a lawsuit, in which a prevailing plaintiff potentially would be entitled all of the remedies available under the LAD and common law, including attorneys’ fees and costs.   The new law is unclear, however, as to whether a current or former employee is “aggrieved” only when an employer seeks to enforce a prohibited provision, or whether a cause of action would arise from simply including such a provision in an employment contract or settlement agreement.

Connecticut Requires Reasonable Accommodation for Pregnant Employees

Bernard E. Jacques

On October 1, 2017 an “Act Concerning Pregnant Women in the Workplace” went into effect in Connecticut.  It has been illegal to discriminate against employees on the basis of pregnancy under both federal and Connecticut law.  However, generally under federal and to a lesser degree under Connecticut law, an employer was not required to make an accommodation for a pregnant employee.  As one court described the law: “employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but non-pregnant employees.”

That is no longer the law in Connecticut.  Now Connecticut employers are obligated “to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee or a person seeking employment due to pregnancy, unless the employer can demonstrate that such accommodation would impose an undue hardship on such employer.”  Pregnancy includes “childbirth or a related condition, including but not limited to lactation.”

A reasonable accommodation includes “being permitted to sit while working, more frequent or longer breaks, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring, light duty assignments, modified work schedules, temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work, time off to recover from childbirth or break time and appropriate facilities for expressing breast milk.”

A Connecticut employer will be required to make these accommodations unless making them would require “significant difficulty or expense.”

The requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation to pregnant employees extends to employers with three or more employees.

In addition, employers are required to notify employees of the new law (i) at the time of hire; (ii) within ten days of learning that an employee is pregnant; and (iii) for all present employees before December 31. This requirement to notify employees may be met with by displaying a poster “in a conspicuous place, accessible to employees at the employer’s place of business” in English and Spanish.

The Connecticut Department of Labor has prepared a poster and employers can obtain the poster by visiting the Department’s web site.

If you have any questions about this or any other Connecticut employment issue, please contact Bernard E. Jacques (

Connecticut Medical Marijuana Law Protecting Employees is Upheld

Bernard E. Jacques

In enacting its medical marijuana law, Connecticut added a provision barring employers from taking adverse employment actions against a “qualifying patient” because of the patient’s use of medical marijuana.  Questions were raised as to whether the Connecticut statute was preempted by federal law, which still makes it a federal crime to use, possess or distribute marijuana.  In a case of first impression, Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Company, LLC, U.S. District Court Judge Meyer held that the Connecticut statute was not preempted, and an employee could sue for discrimination based on the employee’s use of medical marijuana.

Katelin Noffsinger was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) in 2012, and in 2015 her doctors recommended medical marijuana to treat her condition.  Ms. Noffsinger complied with the statute and registered with the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection as a “qualifying patient.”  She began taking one capsule of Marinol, a synthetic form of marijuana, on a daily basis. At the time she began taking the medical marijuana, she was working a recreational therapist at a long term care facility.

In July 2016 Ms. Noffsinger was recruited for a recreation therapy director position at a skilled nursing facility.  After an initial phone interview, she had a personal interview with the director of the facility, who offered her the job. Ms. Noffsinger accepted and began filling out the pre-employment paperwork.  At the insistence of her new employer, she gave notice to her then-current employer.

When completing her pre-employment forms, Ms. Noffsinger revealed that she was a “qualifying patient” using medical marijuana in accordance with the Connecticut statute.  She showed her new employer her registration card with the Department of Consumer Protection, and told her that she took Marinol in the evening before going to bed. She offered to provide additional medical documentation. Her new employer did not ask for any additional information.

As part of her pre-employment process, Ms. Noffsinger submitted a urine sample. Before she started working, her new employer contacted her and told her that she had failed the drug test. She had tested positive for cannabis.  Ms. Noffsinger tried to return to her former job, but it already had been filled. She filed an action against her employer for discriminating against her because of her use of medical marijuana.

Her employer moved to dismiss her claim and argued that Connecticut’s medical marijuana statute was preempted by federal law, which makes it a federal crime to use, possess, or distribute marijuana.  Federal law provides no exception for medical use.  But the court noted that Ms. Noffsinger sought to enforce only that part of the Connecticut statute which prohibits employment discrimination against authorized medicinal marijuana users.  The federal law neither makes it illegal to employ marijuana user, nor does it regulate employment practices.  And the Connecticut statute does not protect use of marijuana on the employer’s property or its use during work hours.  Therefore, the court concluded, the Connecticut medical marijuana law is not preempted by federal criminal drug laws.

Nor is the Connecticut medical marijuana law preempted by the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The employer argued that ADA explicitly states the current drug users are not protected.  But the court saw no conflict between the ADA, which does not protect current drug users, and the Connecticut statute, which does protect a “qualifying patient.”

Although the court’s decision upholding the Connecticut Medical Marijuana law is not binding on any other court, it is likely to be persuasive and employers ignoring the protections afforded a “qualifying patient” using medical marijuana will assume a significant risk.

However, the Connecticut Medical Marijuana law does not protect employees whose positions are regulated by federal law or regulation.  Employees, whose positions are deemed safety sensitive under the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations are still required to comply with those regulations regarding drug use and drug testing.  For those employees a positive marijuana test can result in loss of a job.

If you have any questions regarding this or any other issue of Connecticut employment law, please contact Bernard E. Jacques (